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Competitive games must have players with individual controls and conflicting objectives, but recent work also includes incentives offered by one of the players to the others.
In the incentive game presented here, the Government acts as the leader and offers incentives to consumers, who act as followers.
The Government incentives · offered in this leaderfollower (Stackelberg) game reduce the cost of solar energy to the consumer.
Both the Government and consumers define their own objectives with the Government determining an incentive (either in the form of a subsidy or tax) that satisfies its objective. The two hypothetical examples developed show how the Government can achieve a stated solar utilization rate with the proper incentives.
In the first example the consumer's utility function guarantees some purchases of solar energy.
In the second example~ the consumer's utility function allows for no solar purchases because utility is derived only from the amount of energy used and not from the source of the energy.
The two examples discuss both sUbsidy ~nd tax incentives, with the best control over solar use coming from fossil fuel taxes dependent upon the amount of solar energy used.
Future work will expand this static analysis to develop time varying incentives along a time and quantity dependent learning curve for the solar lndustry.
Introduction
Solar energy incentives can improve the relative economics between solar and fossil fuel.
Presently, solar energy is not economical when compared to fossil fuel, but with future fossil fuel price increases and solar energy price decreases, solar may become competitive in certain locations. Government incentives can help make solar energy competitive sooner by stimulating and developing the solar industry.,
The result~ng solar production increases will lower system costs.
Determining the proper incentive mi~ for the Government to offer is a major problem because consumers' and suppliers' reactions to the incentives must be considered. The Government acting as a leader has a specific short-term target it hopes to achieve with incentives while consumers acting as followers have their own objectives. The Government's short-term objective could be a production target while the consumers' opjectives are to maximize their wellbeing (commonly referred to as utility in economics) subject to the funds they have available with which to purchase energy. Using the single consumer case, these conditions can be expressed analytically as:
Leader ( The model described by (1) ~ (3) does not include Government incentives. In this model · the consumer maximizes his utility subject to the budget constraint to determine his purchases ql* and q2* (with q* denoting the optimal purchases). These values determine the deviation from the Government's objective. The three types of Government incentives available to change the consumers' energy mix are: The subsidy or tax must ensure that, when the consumer acts in his own best interest, the Government's objective is realized. The Government can achieve this by first characterizing the consumers' reaction to various taxes and/or subsidies. This information is then used as a constraint when the Government tries to achieve its objective. Two hypothetical examples are presented which show how the Government can determine the necessary incentives to achieve a targeted production level of solar energy.
Stacke lb erg Example 1
The two examples differ only in the utility derived by the consumer from energy. In both examples the Government's objective is to achieve a targeted solar production level. This production level lsassumed to be a point along a learning curve for the solar industry. The first example assumes a standard consumer utility function which is the fossil fuel usage times the solar energy usage.
The competitive game occurs when the consumer tries to maximize his utility subject to his budget constraintwhlle th~ Government tries Followers' (Consumers') Goal: maximize utility (6 ) Subject to the budget contraint: remains the same; so, when the price of fossil fuel is raised through direct taxes, the amount of fossil energy consumed is reduced with no effect on solar energy consumption. This is why, at point 2, the solar subsidy increased the use of solar energy with no effect on the use of fossil energy; but if either a tax or subsidy is used to move the consumer to point 2, he is better off than he was at point 1. Thus, the individual would benefit from the incentive program because the Government must increase the consumers' energy budget to achieve the targeted solar energy level.
The targeted solar level is achieved at point 3, but the use of fossil fuel has increased. The necessary tax is -$1.875 q2 per unit of fossil fuel. The budget line, including this incentive, has end points equal to the initial budget line. The consumer is better off at point 3 than at point 1 because he can now purchase more solar energy and more fossil fuel. With this subsidy the consumer is not only paid to increase his use of solar energy but also to increase his use of fossil energy.
Point 4 is located on the budget line, but since it has less utility than point 1, it was not initially chosen. rhis point would be chosen if the tax were -$7.?0 q2 + $3.00. The net government cost at this point is zero (i.e., taxes equal subsidies) because the point is on the original buqget curve. This point can also be attained by rationing fossil fuel to one unit or by regulating solar energy usage to 0.4 unit.
With the proper mix of subsidies and taxes, any point in the ql -q2 plane can be made desirable to the consumer, providing that ql is less than I/Pl' A major problem with using the standard utility function for solar energy analysis is that both types of energy must b~ used or the utility is zero.
In most processes where solar energy is a feasible substitute for fossil fuel, the total amount of energy is more important than having some of each type. This suggests that a plausible objective for the consumer may be obtaining the most energy possible within the budget constraint.
Stackelberg Example 2
The secon9 example shows how a consumer reacts if he desires to maximize the amount of energy used. This is also equivalent to minimizing the per unit cost of energy.
The Government's goal (Eq. (5)) and the consumer's budget coqstraint (Eq. (7)) are the same, but the consumer'S utility is now:
The utility curves are straight lines denoting equal energy usage.
The value of a unit of energy is the same to the consumer, no matter where it comes from.
Subsidies and taxes are again investigated using this new utility function. Figure 2 is the desired energy mix without subsidies or taxes. Since utility is defined as the total amount of energy, the optima+ mix is to buy on the cheapest; and in this case, fossil fuel. Thus, solar is not initially being used, so subsidies and taxes must be offered before solar penetrates the market. The evaluation of hoW incentives affect multiple consumers a nd/or producers is a straightforward extension of the present analysis.
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